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Abstract
This article analyses the interactions between the members of the Polish parliament with the European commissioners
in the context of the European Semester, the annual cycle of economic coordination. The Commission drafts crucial doc‐
uments in this process which assess the implementation of the Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs): the Annual
(Sustainable) Growth Survey and the Country Reports. The goal of this article is to assess how the Commission is held to
account by a national parliament and how this affects the level of implementation of CSRs. The findings suggest that the
Commission is accountable to this national parliament, even if the form of accountability taken is rather innovative and
its policy impact limited, at both the EU (the CSRs tend to be immune to Members of [national] Parliament’s contestation)
and the national level, as the implementation of CSRs seems to be independent of the level of their scrutiny.
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1. Introduction
The euro crisis led to the introduction of a number
of institutional changes in the economic and fiscal
surveillance of the EU—the European Semester—which
represent much more fundamental shifts than merely
enhancing existing rules tomake themmore enforceable.
In particular, it gave a number of EU institutions a large
‘discretionary space’ to intervene in the domestic poli‐
cymaking of the member states and consequently cre‐
ated an accountability deficit at the EU level (Dawson,
2015). Importantly, this space includes not only the level
of indebtedness but also recommendations on virtually
all other policies, such as taxation, social protection, and
public health. However, the problem with these Country
Specific Recommendations (CSRs) is their very low imple‐
mentation rate (Darvas & Leandro, 2015). The European
Commission has tried to address this problem by engag‐
ing with national parliaments (NPs) and thus increas‐
ing ‘ownership.’ Indeed, it has been demonstrated that
among its three forms, the cognitive ownership is partic‐
ularly relevant in the context of the commissioners’ visits
in the NPs (the two other being institutional and politi‐
cal ownership): “Whereas institutional ownership by the
NPs seems low, meetings organized with the EU admin‐
istration as well as the newly introduced ‘Semester vis‐
its’ from commissioners have raised the cognitive own‐
ership of the process among members of national parlia‐
ments” (Vanheuverzwijn & Crespy, 2018, p. 589). Some
scholars also suggested that hearings in the NPs’ joint
committees with the relevant commissioner discussing
CSRs and other relevant documents could be one option
for ‘an enhanced European Semester’:
Strengthen national parliamentary scrutiny over
the European Commission: Parliamentary commit‐
tees could invite representatives of the European
Commission to discuss the Annual Growth Survey.
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More ambitiously, a hearing with the responsible
commissioner or Commission Vice‐President would
take place before a joint committee meeting and he
or she would have to present and justify CSRs as well
as assess the progress of government in their imple‐
mentation. (Kreilinger, 2016, p. 57)
Moreover, it has been claimed that “greater parliamen‐
tary accountability should eventually contribute to the
collective ownership of the European Semester” (Crum,
2018, p. 283) and that the ‘legitimacy’ of the Semester
is positively related to its ‘efficiency,’ i.e., the imple‐
mentation rate of the CSRs (Hagelstam et al., 2018).
It seems to support the claim made by the European
Parliament, which in its resolution on the Annual Growth
Survey (AGS) in 2018 stated that it “believes that more
national ownership through genuine public debates at
the national level would lead to better implementa‐
tion of the CSRs; considers it important to ensure
that national parliaments debate country reports and
CSRs” (European Parliament, 2018, p. 9). However, as
the authors themselves admit, a causal link has yet to
be established:
At Member State level, drawing a clear link between
the degree of national parliamentary involvement
and the CSRs’ implementation rate seems to [be]
more difficult, probably due to the fact that the imple‐
mentation rate depends on many factors (of which
the degree of parliamentary involvement is only one).
(Hagelstam et al., 2018, p. 21)
Moreover, questions remain as to the exact form this
involvement takes, the implications for the Commission’s
accountability, and the actual policy effects of the ‘gen‐
uine public debates at national level.’ This article aims to
address some of those issues.
This article builds on the findings of Hallerberg and
colleagues (2018), who demonstrated that non‐euro par‐
liaments scrutinize the European Semester more closely
than those in the euro countries. By offering an in‐depth
analysis on the content of parliamentary hearings on the
European Semester, this article sheds light on the role
of parliaments in holding the supranational executive to
account in the EU’s economic governance. The account‐
ability of governments to NPs in the EU has been dis‐
cussed in the literature for decades (e.g., Hefftler et al.,
2015; Maurer & Wessels, 2001). Earlier work focused
on accountability across levels and parliaments (e.g.,
Benz, 2006, 2013; Kohler‐Koch & Rittberger, 2007; Lord,
2014; Schmidt, 2004). Most recently, Fabbrini employed
a comparative federalism perspective to demonstrate
that “EU executive power is thus like a two‐headed ele‐
phant. The Commission‐head is institutionally account‐
able but on issues of low domestic political salience,
while the European Council‐head is institutionally unac‐
countable on issues of high domestic political salience”
(Fabbrini, 2021, p. 13). However, the research on how
the EU institutions can be held to account at the national
level, especially on issues of high political salience, is
scarce (but see Crum & Oleart, 2020; Fromage, 2017;
Tesche, 2019). Moreover, the literature using account‐
ability frameworks has focused on EU affairs in general
(Auel, 2007; Auel et al., 2015; Bergman & Damgaard,
2000; Bergman et al., 2003; Jancic, 2011; MacCarthaigh,
2007; Raunio, 2001; Wouters & Raube, 2012). By con‐
trast, this article studies accountability in economic pol‐
icy, offering an in‐depth analysis of this crucial field.
The available empirical research regarding parliamen‐
tary accountability of economic governance is rather
scarce and tends to be limited both when it comes
to scope and timeframe (but see Auel & Höing, 2014;
Jancic, 2016; Maatsch, 2017a, 2017b; Schweiger, 2021;
Serowaniec, 2016, pp. 195–199, 263–264). Furthermore,
many comparative studies on the engagement of NPs
in EU economic governance or the European Semester
tend to include the eurozone members only (Fasone,
2015, 2018; Haas et al., 2020; Pernice, 2017) even
though the European Semester concerns all EU coun‐
tries, including the ‘new member states’ which joined
in 2004–2007 and since then its “domestic politics… has
more leeway to shape—and limit—the Europeanization
process” (Woźniakowski et al., 2018, p. 8). By exploring
the debates on the crucial documents of economic gover‐
nance, the AGS and Country Reports in which the assess‐
ment of the implementation of the CSRs is provided,
I help to close this gap in the literature.
In analysing the questions asked by the members of
parliament (MPs), I focus particularly on those related to
the CSRs. The focus on CSRs has several advantages: First,
as the CSRs constitute the most important (and intru‐
sive) element of the Semester for national legislatures
andwas perhaps themain reasonbehind its introduction,
analysing the level of CSRs’ scrutiny allows to draw con‐
clusions about the legitimacy of the process as a whole.
Second, the analysis of the specific questions about the
CSRs allows one to not only see how but alsowhy certain
recommendations are contested. Third, I will also try to
test a hypothesis that CSRs with a higher ownership level
are more likely to be implemented. In so doing, I group
theCSR‐related questions in a given year according to the
sub‐recommendations (each CSR usually contains sev‐
eral specific policy recommendations) and their imple‐
mentation in the following year. Hence, I divide each
CSRs into subcategories, the implementation of which is
assessed by the Commission in the Country Reports.
This article will be structured as follows. In the sec‐
ond Section, “Analytical Framework,” I discuss the defi‐
nition of accountability and my method. This is followed
by Section 3, “Empirics,” in which the hearings are exam‐
ined. Section 4 concludes.
2. Analytical Framework
Including information as a part of an accountability
chain recognizes the fact that fora are not unitary
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actors and that some groups within them are likely
to exercise their accountability rights by a demand for
information only. Contrary to what scholars used to
believe (the so‐called ‘old dualism,’ for instance of par‐
liaments versus governments), a forum is composed
of at least two different groups (‘new dualism’; Auel,
2007, p. 487), depending on the scrutinized issue, of
those contesting (opponents) and those justifying (propo‐
nents). In the case of NPs, the most fundamental distinc‐
tion is between the parliamentary majority and govern‐
ment on the one hand, and the opposition on the other.
While the former group tends to publicly demand infor‐
mation only and challenge/demand change or sanction
of the actor through informal channels (informal meet‐
ings, intra‐party groups, etc.), the latter is more likely to
contest/challenge the conduct of the actor publicly.
According to Auel, such an acknowledgement of the
fact that parliaments are divided allows for the recog‐
nition of different forms of scrutiny that the two parlia‐
mentary groups are likely to perform (Auel, 2007, p. 487).
Consequently, she introduces two elements of account‐
ability (monitoring and political scrutiny) which corre‐
spond to the first two steps of the process. Moreover,
for each step, a different parliamentary group is pri‐
marily ‘responsible.’ Consequently, monitoring scrutiny
is the element of accountability which is conducted in
the first stage and is “an important part of, and a pre‐
requisite to, full accountability” (Auel, 2007, p. 500).
Within this element (and stage) an “agent is obliged
to inform the principal about his (planned) behaviour
and actions, by providing information on the perfor‐
mance of tasks, on procedures and outcomes” in order
to reduce ‘information asymmetries.’ Significantly, with‐
out adequate information, one cannot speak about full
accountability. Indeed, the role of this first step of ‘mon‐
itoring scrutiny’ is to demand information and this stage
is likely to be executed by those with the parliamentary
majority. Certainly, it is unrealistic to expect this group
to challenge the government publicly, if this is the actor
that is held to account.
However, the second stage (political scrutiny) is usu‐
ally performed by the parliamentary opposition and
this is when the government’s conduct is challenged
and contested in public. This is the stage when the
assessment and judgment of the ‘appropriateness of
the government’s decision’ takes place. This element
of accountability is exercised by using various forms
such as “parliamentary questions and public debate”
(either in the committees or in the plenary), which
allows for “assessing and criticizing the government’s
actions” (Auel, 2007, p. 500). By building on this work,
Woźniakowski, Maatsch, and Miklin, in the Introduction
to this Issue (2021, p. 97), distinguished two forms of
accountability: “1. Justification, or the lighter form of
accountability, including questions demanding informa‐
tion and explanation; 2. Contestation, or the heavier
form of accountability, including statements of disagree‐
ment, requests for change, and sanctions.” Consequently,
this conceptual model offers a lower and upper limit of
accountability, corresponding to its two basic forms:
a) Lower limit of accountability: the presence of
Commission representatives at the NPs hearing in
which the questions asked demand information
and explanation and therefore fall within the jus‐
tification form of accountability;
b) Upper limit of accountability: the questions asked
during hearings demand change, sanctions, or
express disagreement and therefore fall within the
contestation form of accountability.
In contrast to the definition of Bovens and colleagues
who claim that “[a]ccountability is furthermore a ret‐
rospective ex‐post–activity” (Bovens et al., 2014, p. 6),
I argue instead that the most valuable form of account‐
ability is ex‐ante (Eriksen & Katsaitis, 2020). This is the
only timewhen the forumcan not only sanction the actor
for bad conduct but also prevent it from happening in
the first place, potentially reducing reputational costs
(Busuioc & Lodge, 2016). Indeed, as Auel notes, such
monitoring and scrutiny of governments is particularly
important in “European policy making, as national par‐
liaments, or more specifically, the majority parties, are
not directly involved in decision making at the European
level” (Auel, 2007, p. 498).
Importantly, a few scholars working on the role of
NPs in the EU use the framework of accountability (but
see, e.g., Barrett, 2015; Crum, 2018). Existing studies
have not been able to capture the essence of accountabil‐
ity mechanisms because they did not follow an approach
that emphasizes the substance of interactions. By con‐
trast, I focus on the substance of the exchanges between
an actor (the Commission) and a forum (lower cham‐
ber of the Polish parliament, the Sejm) in the account‐
ability chain. I divided these interactions into falling
within the scope of the abovementioned two forms of
accountability, as shown in the following section. While
this analytical framework is admittedly more appropri‐
ate for an analysis of ‘regular’ accountabilitymechanisms
between parliamentarians and the members of govern‐
ment, I believe that it is still useful in examining com‐
missioners visits in the NPs as “an innovative form of
accountability of EU decision‐making” (Crum & Oleart,
2020, p. 6).
3. Empirics
Clearly, the forum to which the Commission is account‐
able is the European Parliament. Nevertheless, the
Two‐Pack provided an opportunity for the eurozone
countries to invite a commissioner to NPs in order to
discuss different elements of the European Semester,
but few eurozone countries have used this opportunity.
In fact, it has been demonstrated that the non‐euro states
scrutinize the Semester more than the euro members
(cf. Hallerberg et al., 2018). By conducting an in‐depth
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case study of the largest non‐eurozone country, I build
on this previous research and aim to examine how the
Commission is held to account by the Polish parliament
and how this affects the implementation level of the CSRs.
I examined all hearings held by the Sejm with
the European commissioners in the context of the
European Semester in the first decade since its intro‐
duction (2011–2020). There were six such hearings
in total: Four were held with Janusz Lewandowski,
then Budget and Financial Programming Commissioner
(2010–2014), during the seventh term of the Sejm,
when Civic Platform (PO) and Polish People’s Party (PSL)
formed a governing coalition; and two were held with
Valdis Dombrovskis, then Vice‐President of the European
Commission (2014–2019) responsible for the Euro, Social
Dialogue, and the Financial Stability, Financial Services,
and Capital Markets Union, during the eighth term of
Sejm, when Law and Justice (PiS) held power. I focus on
committee hearings in the lower chamber of the Polish
parliament, the Sejm, because it is here, and not the
plenary, where the European Semester is scrutinized.
The four hearings with Lewandowski took place in 2013
and 2014 and concerned two types of document drafted
by the Commission: the AGS discussed on 22 February
2013 (Sejm, 2013a) and 10 January 2014 (Sejm, 2014a);
and CSRs for Poland, debated on 7 June 2013 (Sejm,
2013b) and 5 June 2014 (Sejm, 2014b). However, the
accountability mechanisms exercised during those hear‐
ings were quite blurred for two reasons. First, during the
winter cycles in both 2013 and 2014, when the AGS was
debated, not only the Polish MPs but also Members of
the European Parliament (MEPs) took an active part and
asked questions of the commissioner. Secondly, during
the spring cycles of the Semester (in 2013 and 2014),
when the CSRs were discussed, not only the commis‐
sioner but also ministers from the government were
questioned. As a result, it was often difficult to distin‐
guish questions addressed to the commissioner from
those directed towardsmembers of the government. For
these reasons, and given the limited space of an article
format, I decided to focus on the remaining hearingswith
Valdis Dombrovskis, as those were representative for the
purpose of illustrating innovative accountability mecha‐
nisms between the European Commission and NP and
their impact on policy‐making.
The first hearing on the AGS and Country Report
2017 took place on 9 March 2017 (Sejm, 2017) at a
joint session of three of the Sejm’s committees: Public
Finances, Economy and Development, and European
Union Affairs. It was chaired by Izabela Kloc of the gov‐
erning PiS party, chair of the European Union Affairs
Committee. Dombrovskis presented detailed informa‐
tion about both documents, including the Commission’s
work plan regarding financial and economic issues, and
an assessment of the implementation of CSRs in Poland.
This found that Poland had made limited progress, with
the second‐lowest score on a scale of 1 to 5. As stated
by the commissioner, this was in line with the EU aver‐
age of 1–2. Afterwards, he answered three rounds of
questions from the MPs. Nine MPs (six from PiS, three
from the opposition: one from PO, and two from the
Modern party [N]) asked 21 questions in total. The com‐
missioner came to Warsaw again one and a half years
later (23 November 2018) to discuss the next cycle of the
Semester (Sejm, 2018). Importantly, his visit was orga‐
nized just after the release of the AGS andWork Program,
but before the publication of the Country Report. Thus,
this hearing did not concern the Report, where—inter
alia—the assessment of the CSRs is included. However,
in his introductory remarks, Dombrovskis did outline the
CSRs that the Commission had issued for Poland in May,
in addition to outlining the economic situation in Europe,
the priorities of the Commission’s economic policy for
the next year, and the assessment of the economic sit‐
uation in Poland. The debate which followed had four
rounds of questions and, similar to the debate from
March in the previous year, there was a joint session of
the EU and the two sectoral committees. This time, the
head of the Public Finance Committee, Andrzej Szlachta
(PiS) chaired the hearing, in which 18 questions were
asked in total. Although the hearings took place in both
2017 and 2018, the AGS of 2018was not debated, as only
the 2017 and 2019 cycles of the European Semesterwere
subject to hearings with the commissioner. On 26March
2018, the committees of EU affairs and Public Finance
had a hearing with Günther Oettinger about the future
EU budget and the Commission’s work plan, and thismay
explain the lack of debate about the European Semester
in the 2018 cycle.
The analysis shows a clear difference between the
two hearings due to their timing: While in the hear‐
ing from March 2017 both the AGS and Country Report
(the 2017 cycle of the Semester), which assessed the
implementation of the CSRs were subject to the debate,
the meeting from November 2018 (the 2019 cycle of
the Semester) concerned only the AGS because the
Country Report is published later on in the process, in
February. This creates a clear trade‐off for parliamen‐
tarians on when to invite the commissioner. Holding
the hearing early in the process, i.e., in the autumn,
enables them to gather information that could be used
later on in the process of scrutinizing the Semester
(e.g., during the debates on Convergence and National
Reform Programmes with the members of the govern‐
ment). It may potentially allow them to influence how
the socioeconomic situation of Poland will be assessed
by the Commission in the Country Report, for example
allowing for ex‐ante scrutiny. On the other hand, there
is a clear advantage to also debating the Country Report,
as it constitutes the most detailed analysis of the coun‐
try, including the most controversial issues, such as the
assessment of the implementation of the CSRs.
How does the exercise of this innovative form of
accountability fit the analytical framework? Around half
of the questions raised demanded information and the
other half were almost equally divided between requests
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for justification and acts of contestation (mainly expres‐
sions of disagreement) of the Commission’s conduct.
Hence, three‐quarters of questions reached the lower
limit of accountability; and one‐quarter, its upper limit,
as defined in Section 2.When it comes to the CSR‐related
interactions, there were five questions about the CSRs
of 2016 that were asked about during the 2017 hearing.
Out of the 21 asked in total, three of them requested
information/explanation (justification form of account‐
ability) and in two questions the MPs criticized the CSRs
(contestation, i.e., the ‘heavier’ form of accountability).
The progress of those CSRs was assessed in the Country
Report 2017, which was the subject of the hearing and
the overall evaluation was limited progress’ (on a scale:
no‐, limited‐, some‐, substantial progress, full implemen‐
tation). However, the details of the assessment of each
CSR as well as sub‐CSRs are provided below. In the 2018
hearing, nobody asked a question related to the CSRs—
this may be explained by the timing of the hearing, as
explained earlier.
3.1. Justification
A question related to a part of CSR1 (i.e., “Strengthen
the fiscal framework, including by establishing an inde‐
pendent fiscal council”), on the role of a fiscal coun‐
cil, was asked by Marcin Święcicki from PO, who was
wondering what the competencies of such a council
could be, how it could impact the decisions regarding,
for instance, retirement age, the countries in which it
exists, and about the arguments in favour of creating
such a council. Dombrovskis provided a detailed answer
stressing that such a council would produce an indepen‐
dent budgetary forecast and provide advice to the gov‐
ernment, which would strengthen the fiscal framework
of a member state. The implementation of CSR1 was
assessed as ‘limited progress’ overall, but no progress
with this specific sub‐recommendation concerning a fis‐
cal council (European Commission, 2017, p. 14). Even
though this issue was not contested in the parliament,
and perhaps because both the PO and PiS governments
failed to create a fiscal council, the Commission dropped
this sub‐CSR in the following year.
The next question did not concern any particular CSR,
but the overall system of recommendations. Namely,
the same opposition MP (Święcicki) asked how the
Commission could influence countries which do not
implement recommendations, such as Poland, which
ignored the CSR regarding retirement age. He asked
whether the instruments that the Commission has at
its disposal to encourage or force countries to imple‐
ment the CSRs were sufficient and if it would use differ‐
ent instruments for eurozone and non‐eurozone coun‐
tries. In the light of the fact that the implementation
record is limited in most EU states, he asked if the
Commission should have stronger enforcement instru‐
ments. Dombrovskis provided a detailed answer inwhich
he stressed that the CSRs are not injunctions, but only
recommendations, and therefore the Commission does
not have any mechanisms to enforce them. In the
Commission’s view, he stressed, the main means to
ensure that recommendations are implemented are
dialogue with NPs parliaments and promotion of the
Commission’s agenda to assure member states that its
recommendations are beneficial for them.
The third question related to a sub‐recommendation
of CSR1 (“Improve tax collection by ensuring better VAT
compliance”). Wojciech Zubowski (PiS) was quite spe‐
cific and asked about the Commission’s plans regarding
the VAT gap. After praising the fact that the Commission
appreciated Polish efforts in fighting VAT evasion, he
asked about its plans in fighting such white‐collar
crimes. Indeed, the Commission assessed that ‘some
progress’ had been made in “ensuring better tax compli‐
ance” (European Commission, 2017, p. 14). Dombrovskis
replied that this was a priority of the Commission, which
works on this issue within, for instance, OECD programs
on the erosion of the tax base. Regarding the VAT gap, he
praised the Polish authorities for making some progress
in this matter and promised to work closely together on
tax evasion. He added that taxes should be paid in the
country where the economic activity is conducted and
not where taxes are the lowest. In the next year’s CSR,
this sub‐recommendation was dropped, even if its imple‐
mentation was assessed as ‘some progress’ in the 2017
Country Report.
3.2. Contestation
Two questions were clearly contesting CSR2 (“Ensure the
sustainability and adequacy of the pension system and
increase participation in the labourmarket, by starting to
reform the preferential pension arrangements, removing
obstacles to more permanent types of employment and
improving the labour market‐relevance of education and
training”). Both were asked by PiS MPs and concerned a
CSR, the implementation of which in the Country Report
was assessed as ‘no progress,’ both overall and for every
sub‐recommendation. Moreover, it noticed that “key
measures in the legislative process go in the opposite
direction” (European Commission, 2017, p. 14). The two
questions were asked about the lowering of the statu‐
tory retirement age, which entered into force in October
2017. Jan Mosiński (PiS) criticized the commissioner’s
assessment that the lowering of the statutory retirement
age, a reversal of the previous reform, would have a neg‐
ative impact on the economic condition of the country.
He stressed that people of his age are exhausted as a
result of the system and organization of work in commu‐
nist Poland and the fact that many countries in Western
Europe have a shorter working week than Poland, which
leads to better health and the possibility of working
longer and retiring at an older age. Wojciech Zubowski
(PiS) also focused on the worse health condition of those
over the age of 60 in Poland compared to other coun‐
tries. He cited OECD data from 2013 which showed that
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only 15% of Poles regarded their health as good or very
good, which would allow them to work, compared to
50% in the UK and almost 60% in the Netherlands. In his
answer, Dombrovskis stressed that in Commission’s view
high participation in the labour market and economic
growth should be ensured and that lowering the statu‐
tory retirement age could undermine the future of the
pension system.
The fact that this sub‐section of CSRwas contested by
theMPs did not lead to the Commission changing it in the
following year. In fact, while the overall CSR was changed
and its implementation increased from ‘no progress’ to
‘limited progress,’ when it comes to the contested sub‐
recommendation, it appeared again. What is more, the
most contested issue (the demand to increase the retire‐
ment age) appeared in the CSR the next year expressis
verbis, which means that not only did the Commission
not change its behaviour according to the wishes of the
MPs, it even strengthened its stance towards this con‐
tested issue. Thus, the contestation of this CSR did not
lead to policy change, both in terms of actor’s behaviour
or its implementation.
Out of four questions about three specific sub‐CSRs,
the Commission dropped two of them in the following
year (on the fiscal council and on the better VAT com‐
pliance), but those were not contested. The only one
which was contested did lead to a change, but not in
the direction hoped for by the MPs, as the sub‐CSR in
2017 on the pension reform was even strengthened and
explicitly demanded “measures to increase the effective
retirement age” (European Commission, 2018, p. 12)—
the exact policymeasure that theMPs hadopposed a few
months earlier. When it comes to a link between own‐
ership and implementation, in the sub‐CSRs concerning
pension system, no change in the implementation level
could be observed (‘no progress’ in both 2016 and 2017);
one sub‐CSR on the fiscal council was dropped (but was
not implemented); and the third, on VAT compliance,
was dropped, perhaps as a result of improved imple‐
mentation (cf. European Commission, 2018, pp. 15–18).
Those preliminary findings seem to suggest that the link
between ownership and implementation is limited at
best and that the influence of NPs on the Commission
is even weaker.
4. Conclusions
This article demonstrates that an innovative form of
accountability in the context of non‐euro states can be
exercised in a way that enhances the accountability of
the actor. But for this to succeed, both the forum and
the actor need to fulfil some requirements. On the one
hand, the MPs should ask questions that relate to the
area of responsibilities of the Commissioner that is held
to account. On the other hand, the actor being held to
account should engage in a meaningful way with the
forum. They should answer the questions fully with as
much detail as the format of the hearing allows, and
should not evade them by providing hollow, generalised
answers. The quality of the interactions shows that the
Commission has tried to increase the low level of imple‐
mentation of the CSRs by engaging with the members
of the Sejm. The idea (also expressed by Dombrovskis in
one of the hearings when he said that the main means
to ensure that CSRs are implemented are dialogue with
NPs and their promotion in a given country) is that the
greater the ‘ownership’ by MPs, the higher their imple‐
mentation level. However, this article shows that the
strength of the relationship between those two factors
may be exaggerated. In sum, according to the conditions
of accountability employed for this study and outlined
in the Analytical Framework Section, we may conclude
that the Commission is accountable to this national par‐
liament. This is true even if the form of accountability
taken is mainly justification (only quarter of the interac‐
tions fell within the ‘heavier’ form of accountability, i.e.,
contestation) and its policy impact limited, at both the
EU (the CSRs tend to be immune to MPs’ criticism) and
the national level, as the implementation of CSRs seems
to be independent of the level of their scrutiny, at least
in this particular case.
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